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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NONRESIDENT
TUITION FEE
CARLTON E. SPENCER'
Most of the tax supported higher educational institu-
tions of the United States discriminate among their stu-
dents in the matter of tuition fees, basing this discrimina-
tion on the residence of the students; the purpose being to
collect an additional fee from nonresidents. Heretofore,
with few exceptions, the administration of this rule has
been lax. Lax, partly because of lack of faith in the wis-
dom of the policy and partly because of the inability of
busy lay administrative officers to solve the many technical
legal problems which accompany almost every borderline
case. The easiest, and frequently the only, solution is to
let the student off in hard cases. As to the first of these
causes of lenient enforcement, doubt as to policy, this article
will not deal. Suffice it to say that a good many who have
given the matter attention, question if the new blood
brought into a state with the high type of young citizenry
attracted by schools is not of considerable value; if a free
interchange of young men and women between states and
nations is not in itself of great benefit commercially, socially
and otherwise, and if the exchange of students is not so
nearly equal that no state is the gainer by erecting a wall
of exclusion against sister states and nations. These prob-
lems, regarding which it is extremely difficult to get reliable
evidence, are for the other social sciences than law. As for
the present, the nonresidence fee rule is the vogue, having
been demanded by taxpayers who see in it a measure of
economy.
One of the evils resulting from loose enforcement mani-
fests itself in unfairness to those who are conscientious and
in a disrespect for law and honesty among those who evade
the rule. In many places a student who is so simple as
to get caught by the fee is an object of derision, among his
R egistrar, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon.
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fellows. As a result, misstatements, even under oath, re-
garding matters concerning which mistake is impossible,
are not uncommon. Examples are: a false statement that
the father is dead; that the signer, who has just arrived,
has been domiciled in the state a year; that parents are
residents of a state in which they have never lived. The
students are not entirely to blame, because lax enforcement
encourages deception, and custom and student public opin-
ion approve the policy of beating the rule if you can. This
situation is recognized by those in charge. The following
statements have been taken from letters from university
officials: "The determination from nonresident fees is one
of my exasperating tasks." "It is the bane of my exis-
tence." "We do not know of any satisfactory way to
differentiate between those who should be charged and
those who should not. We feel that the liar gets by and
the honest man pays." "We find that the students have
no objection to the payment of regular fees but will even
perjure themselves to attempt to get out of the payment
of non-resident fees." "It amounts to a training school
for perjurers." "Some to get out of paying the fee will
declare themselves citizens when they have no intention
of becoming citizens."
It would seem from every viewpoint that the nonresident
rule, if it is to be enforced at all, should be enforced
strictly. Any exceptions should be made advisedly, based
on policy, and should be understood as exceptions and not
as evasions of the rule. If there are benefits to be derived
through the exclusion of nonresidents or the gaining of
revenue from those who come, these benefits can best be
obtained by strict enforcement. If the policy is not sound,
socially and economically, that fact will be most quickly
demonstrated by strict enforcement. Meanwhile, a demor-
alizing practice which encourages deceit and misstatement
and generates disrespect for law will have been discontin-
ued. Hence, the problem with which this article has to
deal is, what is the extreme to which an educational institu-
tion can go legally in collecting the nonresident fee?
A number of institutions have adopted the "one-year
rule" requiring every student to pay the nonresident fee
who has not been domiciled in the state for at least one
2
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year prior to enrollment.2 This has proved a very practi-
cal device for safeguarding the bona fides of alleged domi-
cile. In a field where the determining factors are, for
the most part vague and intangible, here is one thing that
can be seized upon that is definite, certain and capable of
proof, actual presence in the state for one year. But, as
pointed out hereafter, mere physical presence in the state
does not amount to domicile, and after a year has elapsed
we still have the problem of determining legal residence.
The decision has merely been postponed a year, for even
though the individual can show that he has lived in the
state, he must still be required to prove that hid domicile is
there.
Many things may have an evidentiary bearing ,upon
the question of one's domicile, such as acts and conduct
(which frequently speak louder than words,") making of in-
vestments, building of dwelling house, payment of taxes,
undertaking business pursuits which will cover a long period
of time, exercising the right of suffrage, holding office, oral
and written declarations, reason for leaving former abode-
and relation to it since leaving, membership in lodge, club
and church, location of family and home ties, self-support,
etc. Now, living in a place continuously raises a pre-
sumption of fact that there was intent to remain and become
domiciled there and consequently there is the presumption
that a man who lives continuously irA a state a year before
entering an educational institution did not come there for
the sole purpose of attending that school. Among the var-
ious forms of evidence this particular item has been picked
out and demanded because it is highly significant and be-
cause it is relatively easy to establish. However, bear in
mind that no particular period of time is necessary to
establish domicile and if an immigrant to a state becomes
domiciled the day of his arrival, he is then just as much a
citizen and resident of that state as he is twelve months
later. Consequently, in many cases residents, as well as
3 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii. Illinois. Kentucky,
Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Tennessee, Washington and Wisconsin
require one year's residence. Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota and Nevada require slx
months.
* Moffett v. Hill, 181 II. 239. 22 N. E. 821 (1889) quoting Kreltz v. Behrensmeyer,
125 II. 195, 17 N. E. 282 (1888) ; "On questions of domicile less weight should be given
to a person's declarations than to his acts."
3
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nonresidents, may be forced to pay the fee throughout the
one-year period.
In the only case which the writer has found where the
nonresident fee has been taken to a supreme court4 the
question of the constitutionality of granting educational
privileges to one citizen and withholding them from an-
other on the basis that one has been a citizen longer than
another was involved. In the case of Bryan v. Regents of
University of California,5 Miss Bryan, a minor, who with
her parents had resided in California for eleven months,
sought to force the university to admit her without payment
of the nonresident fee of $75 for the first semester. This
the university refused to do, relying on the following defini-
tion in the statute: "A non-resident student as used in this
section shall mean any person who has not for more than
one year immediately preceding his entrance into the uni-
versity been a bona fide resident of the state of California."
Miss Bryan contended that this legislation and the rule of
the board of regents adopted in pursuance thereof was in
violation of the state constitution which prohibits the grant-
ing of privileges or immunities to any citizen or class of
citizens "which upon the same terms shall not be granted to
all citizens." The statutes of California include in the
definition of citizens of the state "all persons born out of
this state who are citizens of the United States and residing
within this state." Miss Bryan was clearly a citizen of
California.
It was agreed that the legislature has power to enact
laws classifying citizens where the classification is not un-
reasonable and arbitrary. For example, citizens are classi-
fied on the basis of period of residence in regard to voting
and holding office. Miss Bryan, however, contended that
there were no reasonable grounds for granting and deny-
ing university privileges on this basis. But the court says,
"Now, one reason for denying a citizen of the state the
right to vote in the state until he has been a resident of the
state one year is that his residence for one year within the
' The writer believes that the fact that the matter has not been taken to the courts
I due to the tendency to give the student the "benefit of the doubt" wherever there
have been close cases.
1 188 Cal. 559, 205 Pac. 1071 (1922).
4
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state is evidence of his bona fide intent to remain in the
state permanently * * * *. There seems to be no good
reason for holding that the legislature may not make a
similar classification in fixing the privilege for attending
the state university." The court then discusses the im-
possibility of the state's educating-all its citizens, limited
facilities, increased enrollment and burden on taxpayers,
and concludes that requiring a student to maintain a resi-
dence in the state a year as evidence of the bona fides of
his intention to remain a permanent resident of the state,
and that he is not temporarily residing there for the mere
purpose of attending the university, is not an unreasonable
or unconstitutional exercise of discretion by the legislature
or the university.
The one-year rule makes a valuable and significant item
of evidence and postpones the necessity of determining the
domicile of the individual, but it does not in itself solve the
problem. After a man has lived in the state a year, there
is still the question, has he been an actual legal resident or
has he been merely living there temporarily? This opens-
up the entire field of residence and domicile. The first
difficulty confronting the university administrator at this
stage is to find a workable definition of residence. In con-
templation of law, residence is so closely involved with the
term domicile that it cannot be considered separately, and
we may well consider the meaning of domicile first.
The difficulty of defining the word is well illustrated
by the following quotations cited by the Oregon court in
the case of Reed's Will.4 "Domicile is difficult of accurate
definition and the opinion has been expressed by many
judges and writers that the term cannot be successfully de-
fined so as to embrace all its phases. Mr. Justice Shaw
says: 'No exact definition can be given of domicile; it de-
pends upon no one fact or combination of circumstances,
but from the whole taken together it must be determined
in each particular case.' Thorndike v. Boston, 1 Metc.
(Mass.) 242. Vice-Chancellor Kindersley observes: 'With
respect to those questions of domicile, there is no precise
definition of the word, or any formula laid down by the ap-
0 48 Ore. 500, 87 Pac. 763, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1159 (1906).
5
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plication of which to the facts of the case it is possible at
once to say where the domicile may be.' Cockrell v. Cock-
rell, 25 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 730, 731; Cockrell v. Cockrell, 2
Jur. (N. S.) 727. Lord Chancellor Hatherley declined to
'add to the many ineffectual attempts to define' the term:
Undy v. Undy, L. R. 1 Sc. & Div. App. 441, 449. Mr. Ja-
cobs and Mr. Dicey have both devoted many pages to a
discussion of domicile and they each point out the variety
of attempts to define it, and how futile have been the ef-
forts: Jacobs, Domicile, Sec. 56 et seq.: Dicey, Conflict of
Laws, p. 79."
One of the most common legal definitions of domicile has
it as the place where a person has his true, fixed, perma-
nent home, and principal establishment, and to which,
whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.7
The concept of home enters in practically all legal defini-
tions or descriptions of domicile.8 The word is derived from
the Latin domus meaning a home or dwelling house and no
one word is more nearly synonymous with domicile than
the word home.9 The Roman codes described domicile as
follows: "In whatever place an individual has set up his
household gods, and made the chief seat of his affairs and
interests, from which, without special avocation, he has no
intention of departing; from which, when he has departed
he is considered to. be from home; and to which, when he
has returned, he is considered to have returned home. In
this place there is no doubt whatever, he has his domicile."'01
Several centuries before the codification of the Roman law,
Cicero in his argument before the praetors for the citizen-
ship of Archius defined domicile as the location of "the
seat of all one's affairs and fortunes.""
The element of intention plays an important part. Some
cases hold that domicile is the place in which a, person has
fixed his habitation with the intention of remaining there
permanently. The two things must coincide or, at least,
I STORY. ComucT Or LAWS 40; 9 R. C. L. 538; 19 C. J. 392; Miller v. Miller,
67 Ore. 69, 186 Pac. 16 (1913).
"By domicile we mean home, the permanent home, and if you do not understand
your permanent home, I am afraid that no illustration drawn from foreign writers or
foreign languages will very much help you do it." Lord Cranworth in Whicker v. Hume,
7 H. L. C. 124, 11 Reprint 50 (1858).
• Burrill v. Jewett. 25 N. Y. Super. Ct. (2 Rob.) 701 (1864).
IPhllmore, Dom., Ch. II.
31 Cicero. Oration for Archias, the Poet V.
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have existed simultaneously at some time, (a) the actual
habitation and (b) the intention of remaining.12 However,
with the transitory population of new countries and the
lack of definite intention regarding the future in the minds
of a migratory people, the better rule substitutes a nega-
tive requirement: "without any intention of removing
therefrom," or "a non-intention of removing therefrom." 18
It is recognized that a man's plans are subject to change.
But habitation for never so long a period without the pro-
per intent will not suffice.
In the case of Winans v. Attorney General,14 a young en-
gineer of Baltimore, went to Russia where he worked at his
profession for nine years when his health forced him for the
next ten years to spend part of his time in England. From
then on he spent substantially all his time ih the British
Isles. He died, having been away from the United States
fifty years and in England forty. In an action involving
legacy duty it was held that he died domiciled in Baltimore,
Maryland, U. S. A. After taking into consideration the pur-
pose of his being in Europe, his acquisition of property and
its location, his objects in life, his allegiance, his future
plans, his oral and written expressions and all the circum-
stances surrounding the case it was clear that, while his
habitation had been elsewhere many, many years, in his
own mind, home was in the United States and the requisite
intention never coincided with his European habitation to
make it his domicile. Likewise Mrs. Reed, the founder of
Reed College, died domiciled in Portland, Oregon, after
having spent the last twelve years of her life in California.8
On the other hand, if the two elements do coincide for
never so short a time, the domicile is established.'( Mr.
White lived on a farm in West Virginia near the Pennsyl-
vania line. He bought a farm a few miles away but on the
Pennsylvania side. He gave up possession of his West
;2 White v. Tennant. 31 W. Va. 790. 13 Am. St. Rep. 898 (1888).
" 19 Cyc. 93; WHARTON, CONFLIC OF LAWS 77; Appeal of Hindman, 85 Pa. 468(1877) ; Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488 (1818).
1, App. Cas. 287, 73 L. J. K. 13, 613. Also Bremer v. Freeman, 10 Moore, P. 0.
1106, "A person may live fifty years In a place and not acquire a domicile, for ho may
have had all the time an intention to return to his own country."
1 Reed's Will, supra n. 6.
25 JACOBS. Dom c 136. "On the one hand, the shortest residence is sufficlent if
the requisite animus bq present, and, on the other, the longest will not suffice if It Bo
absent."
7
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Virginia farm, loaded his goods and family into the wagon
and crossed over to his new home. About the time he had
his wagon unloaded and the furniture in the house his wife
became ill. Rather than undergo the inconvenience of their
unsettled condition he went back across the line to a son's
house. As the days went by the wife recovered but Mr.
White, himself, caught the fever and died. Under-the laws
of West Virginia the wife should get all the personal prop-
erty. The laws of Pennsylvania, however, provided that
the brothers and sisters should get half. The supreme
court of West Virginia found that Mr. White was domiciled
in Pennsylvania at the time of his death and the property
settlement should be made there. He had given up his
home in West Virginia and assumed his habitation in Penn-
sylvania with the intention of making it his permanent
home.17
The meaning of the word residence depends to a great
extent upon where and how it is used, and questions as to
the correspondence or difference in meaning between it and
domicile are referable generally to the wording and pur-
pose of the statutes, in some of which and for certain pur-
poses the words are distinguishable, while in others they
are regarded as synonyms.18 The range in meaning
reaches all the way from temporary abode to permanent
domicile and even further. Webster's dictionary gives the
following as synonyms of reside: to dwell, sojourn, abide,
remain, live. These synonyms represent the common every-
day acceptation of the word. The various shades of mean-
ing ascribed to it legally hinge upon the question, what
other elements, if any, must exist so that a man may be said
to be a resident of the place where he abides, sojourns,
dwells or lives? Must there be an element of permanency
and, if so, to what extent?
A few illustrations will show the great variety of inter-
pretations and the gradations in the degree of permanency
demanded: "Residence means a place of abode; where a
person lives."' 9  "It is sometimes said that any place of
W7 hite v. Tennant. upra n. 12.
9 R. C. L. 540; 34 Cyc. 1637.
z Mays v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. 391, 97 S. W. 703 (1906), (referring to a room in a
school dormitory, the felonious entry of which constituted burglary of a private resi-
dence.)
8
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abode, or dwelling place constitutes a residence, however
temporary it may be. If his intent be to remain, it becomes
his domicile; if his intent be to leave as soon as his purpose
is accomplished, it is his residence."' 2  "Residence simply
indicates the place of abode, whether permanent or tem-
porary."21 Residence, however, even where it is not equiv-
alent to domicile requires something more than mere tem-
porary presence in a locality. "The word residence may re-
fer either to a fixed and settled abode, or to one merely
of some duration." 22 "A mere temporary place of sojourn,
to be sure, could not be called a residence; a limitation to
this effect must be placed upon the very broad language
sometimes used by courts in stating the meaning of the
word. Residence is used to indicate any place of dwelling,
whether more or less permanent, so long as, it is not a tem-
porary place of sojourn; domicile, to denote a fixed perma-
nent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention
of returning."23
Mr. and Mrs. G. S. Reed 24 lived in Oregon thirty-eight
years. On account of Mr. Reed's health they moved to
Pasadena, California, where they purchased residence pro-
p erty. They moved their household effects and personal
belongings from Portland to Pasadena. However, they
made no investments except those necessary for their com-
fort and pleasure. Mr. Reed retained his office and bank
account in Portland and did not dispose of his property
there. Church and charitable interests were retained.
Three years later Mr. Reed died. Mrs. Reed continued to
live in Pasadena until her death, nine years later. Most of
her property she bequeathed to chhritablq and educational
purposes. The statutes of California make void any devise
or bequest for charitable uses in excess of a certain propor-
tionate share of the estate of the deceased. Consequentl5,
when the will was submitted to probate in an Oregon court,
the heirs asserted that Mrs. Reed was domiciled in Cali-
fornia and the disposition of her property was subject to its
Bouvnw's LAW DmzaoNAny 2920.19 C. J. 896.
Kroge v. Modern Brotherhood of America, 126 Mo. ADp. 698, 105 S. W. 085
(1907).
= Treatise No. 1 (a) CONFLICT oF LAWS, THu AMaBICAN LAW INSTITUTIo, 21.26 Reed's Will. supra n. 6.
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laws. The court found, however, that "they at all times
deemed and considered their residence there (at Pasadena)
as temporary rather than permanent, and Portland was
their legal domicile." In this case Mr. Chief Justice Robert
S. Bean distinguishes between residence and domicile, resi-
dence being one of the elements of domicile. "It (domicile)
is not in a legal sense synonymous with residence. A person
may have more than one residence and more than one home,
in the ordinary acceptance of those terms, but he can have
only one domicile. * * * * Domicile is made up of resi-
dence and intention."
On the other hand the two terms are very frequently used
synony~Mously.. 5  "Domicile In its general and populat
sense denotes residence and should be treated as synony-
mous therewith." 26  "The terms residence and domicile
have been held to be synonymous."2 "In the statutes of
several states a definition of residence is given which makes
it identical with domicile, and in Oklahoma the same mean-
ing in'all cases seems to. be given the term by the court.128
Residence has been held in some cases to mean more than
domicile.29
The American Law Institute 0 has summarized the cases
where residence means less than, the same as and more
than domicile. Residence is said to mean less than domicile
(less in the sense that actual residence without the element
of permanency is sufficient) in the following: in some juris-
dictional cases; for the purposes of attachment; in the
school laws; in acts requiring the recording of a clattel
mortgage at the residence; in statutes requiring a nonresi-
dent to give security for costs; in those allowing the arrest
of a nonresident for debt; and in those requiring residents
to serve on a jury.
According to the current of authority residence is synony-
mous with domicile in statutes referring to taxation; in
25 9 R. C. L. 540. 19 C. J. 895.R By. Co. v. McKnight, 99 Tex. 289, 89 S. W. 755 (1905).
I WORD & PnRASES, 1st series, Vol. 8, 2175; 2nd series, Vol. 2, 189.
23 Treatise No. 1 (a) CONFLICT OF LAWS, THE AMERIcAN LAW INSTITUTE 21, citing
CALIFORNIA POLITICAL CODE, 52; REv. CoDEs MONTANA, 1921, 3; NORTH DAKOTA, COMP.
LAws, 1913, 14; Jones v. Reser, 61 Okla. 46, 160 Pac. 58 (1916).
So Hampden v. Levant, 59 Me. 557 (1871). pauper could not 'be made a charge
upon the community unless he actually dwelt there as well as had domicile there.
Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651 (1876). divorce proceedings. St. v. Joyce, 123 La.
681, 49 So. 219 (1909) voting.
to TRATISE No. 1 (a), CONmcT OF LAWS.
10
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statutes requiring residence as a qualification for voting,
(except in Louisiana) ; in some cases involving residence to
gain settlement under the poor-laws; in some cases as a
basis of jurisdiction; in clauses which except nonresidents
from the operation of the statute of limitations under some
circumstances; in a statute requiring an office-holder to be
a resident; in the naturalization act, which requires con-
tinuous residence; in the statute requiring militia service
at one's residence; in the national homestead laws.
In a number of cases involving residence as foundation
of jurisdiction for divorce the term is taken to require, in
addition to domicilean actual residence in the state. This
has also been held in some cases under the poor-laws and
in Louisiana as a qualification for voting. In a statute
which provides that process may be served upon an absent
defendant by notice at his residence, the word must neces-
sarily be interpreted as meaning domicile which is an actual
dwelling place, if the process is to be valid in another state;
and such an interpretation is almost universally placed upon
the word.
The foregoing discussion of the terms involved has been
for the purpose of calling attention to the difficulties con-
fronting a university administrator when he seeks, ready-
made, a definition which he can enforce in collecting fees
from nonresident students. The situation is not improved
by using such words as inhabitancy, citizenship, etc., for
the reason that their meaning also varies as does the subject
matter with reference to which they are used and they
come no nearer being susceptible of an exact, all-reaching
definition.3 1
What shall "residence" mean in the nonresident rules?
Obviously we might choose one of the more liberal mean-
ings. This has been done where elementary school chil-
dren are involved. By the weight of authority statutes
providing for a free public school system have been con-
strued as evidencing an intention on the part of the state
that all the children within its borders shall enjoy the op-
portunity of a free education.3 2 Hence, actual residence
21 Note to Frost v. Brisbin, 82 Am. Dec. 427.
'2 24 R. C. L. 624; People v. Hendrickson, 104 N. Y. S. 122 (1907) ; State v. Selleck,
76 Nebr. 747, 107 N. W. 1022 (1906).
11
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rather than legal residence or domicile has been held suffi-
cient. Especially has this been true where dependent chil-
dren have been placed in institutional homes or sent to
live with r'elatives8s On the other hand, where parents,
well able to take care of their children, have moved into
the town temporarily during the school term, only to move
away again during the summer, for the sole purpose of gain-
ing school privileges,-there the courts have said that resi-
dence means domicile and the parents must pay tuition.34
The cases dealing with school children in the lower
grades cannot be followed with safety. The policy is to
force elementary education upon all children through com-
pulsory attendance law. Children of tender years, as a
general rule, live with their parents and there is not the
problem of "going away to school" that exists with college
students. 5 Furthermore, our purpose is to find the strict-
est workable definition. If we take the term in its lesser
meanings we meet with endless absurdities, because it is
impossible to attend an institution of learning without "re-
siding" there under one or another of the various meanings
of the term.36
The cases where residence means more than domicile
(domicile plus actual abode) hold no possibilities for us,
because there can be no question of "actual abode" when
a student is living at and attending a college. Therefore,
in striving to make the rule most effective we must proceed
on the assumption that residence means domicile.37 There-
fore, the terms will be used as synonymous hereafter.
The one-year rules as worded usually state that the
student, to avoid the fee must have been a resident for
one year prior to enrollment. This would seem to pre-
clude the possibility of his avoiding the fee on the strength
of one year's domicile during which year he was also a
"Board of Trustees v. Powell, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 341; St. v. Clymer, 164 Mo. App.
671, 147 S. W. 1119 (1912) ; People v. Hendrickson, 109 N. Y. S. 403 (1908) ; Ashley v.
Board of Ed.. 275 I11. 274, 114 N. E. 20 (1916) ; People v. Bd. of Ed., 206 Ill. App.
381 (1917). But Lake Farm v. Dist. Bd., 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) -234 and Black V.
Graham. 44 L. I. A. (N. S.) 693. contra.
34 St. v. Sch. Dist., 55 Nebr. 317, 75 N. W. 855 (1898).
U No attempt is made In this article to deal with the problems surrounding the
emancipation of minors.
" N-To student is allowed to graduate without doing work "in residence," as dis-
tinguished from "'in absentia."
V In the state of Washington "domicile" was used by the legislature in relation
to the university; "residence" In relation to the state college. The terms were declared
to be synonymous by the Attorney General.
12
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student. In other words, if a student pays the fee at en-
trance he must pay it throughout his attendance. There
will be cases where this phase of the rule is unenforceable,
and it was so recognized by the University of California.88
Miss Bryan's parents had been domiciled in California
less than a year when she entered the University. Before
the first semester was completed she and her parents had
been residents more than a year. No attempt was made
to require of her the non-resident fee for more than the
first semester. This was a clear case because, she being
a minor, her domicile was by law established independently
of her status as a student or even of her presence in the
state. To have charged her the fee would have been to
discriminate between residents all of whom had been such
for more than a year.
Frequiently adults come to the state, enter the university,
pay the nonresident fee for one year and then claim exemp-
tion on the ground that they have established a domicile.
This type of cases constitutes by far the greatest problem.
The right to vote requires a period of rdsidence and resi-
dence in this connection also means domicile.80 Therefore
we may well turn to the cases involving the right of stu-
dents to vote.40
Whatever confusion there may be as to the meaning of
domicile or residence, it is everywhere agreed that abiding
in a place temporarily will not destroy one's old domicile
or establish a new one at the place of temporary sojourn,
it makes no difference what the purpose may be. Hence, a
temporary stay in a locality for the purpose of attending
- Respondent's Brief, Bryan v. Regents, Sup. Ct. of Cal. 4. oupra n. S.
' Note to Anderson v. Palmer Transfer Co., 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 750.
Colorado. Parsons v. People, 80 Colo. 888. 70 Pac. 689 (1902). Illinois, Dale v.
Irwin, 78 IIl. 170 (1875) ; Welch v. Shumway, 232 i. 64, 88 N. E. 549 (1908) ; Andercon
.. Pifer, 815 Ill. 164, 146 N. E. 171 (1925). Indiana, Pedigo v. Grimes. 118 Ind. 148,
18 N. E. 700 (1887). Iowa, Vanderpoel v. O'Hanlon, 58 Ia. 246, 5. N. W. 119 (1880).
Louisiana, Holmes v. Pino. 131 La. 687, 60 So. 78 (1912). Massachusett, Putnam V.
Johnson, 10 Mass. 488 (1813) ; Opinion of the Justices, 46 Mass. (5 Mete.) 587 (1848).
Maryland. Shaeffer v. Gilbert. 73 Md. 66. 20 At]. 484 (1890). Maine, Sanders a.
Gdtchell. 76 Me. 158, 49 Am. Rep. 606 (1884). Michigan, People v. Osborne, 170 Mich.
143, 135 N. W. 921. 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 168 (1912). Missouri, Hall V. Schoenecke, 128
Mo. 661, 81 S. W. 97 (1895) ; Goben a. Murrell, 195 Mo. App. 104, 190 S. W. 986 (1916).
Nebraska, Berry v. Wilcox. 44 Nebr. 82. 62 N. W. 249 (1895). New Hamnahire., St. V.
Daniels. 44 N. H. 883 (1862). New York. In to Goodman. 146 N. Y. 284. 40 N. E.
769 (1895) ; In re Barry, 164 N. Y. 18, 58 N. E. 12 (1900) ; n ro Blankford et al.;
241 N. Y. 180, 149 N. E. 415 (1925). Ohio, Esker v, McCoy, 6 Oh. Dec. 178, 6 Am.
Law Re. R94 (1878): Wickbam v. Covner. 80 Oh. Cir. Ct. Rep. 765. Pennsylvania,
Fy's Election Casp. 71 Pa. St. 302 (1872); In ,o Lower Oxford Election, 11 Phlla.
641 (1875) : Irn e Merion Election. 1 Cbest. Co. Rev. 267 (1883) ; In re Lower Oxford
Contested Elections, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 328 (1886) ; Wisconsin, Slebold, Ashbahr
Gross, Wadsworth v. Wahl, 159 N. W. 546, 649-50 (1916).
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school or for the purpose of engaging in any other work or
occupation will not establish a domicile. But to determine
the fact of domicile all the circumstances must be taken
into consideration and the nature of the employment is one
of the significant circumstances. Some occupations do not
raise the presumption of permanency of abode; rather, the
opposite. Such a one is attendance at an institution of
learning. Said the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in a carefully framed opinion, "In general,
it may be said, that an intent to change one's domicile and
place of abode is not so readily presumed from a residence
at a public institution for the purposes of education, for a
given length of time, as it would be from a like removal
from one town to another, and residing there for the ordin-
ary purposes of life; and therefore stronger facts and cir-
cumstances must concur to establish the proof of change of
domicile, in the one one case than in the other." 41 From
Maryland, "In the absence of other proof the law would
presume he (the student) was there for the purpose of
prosecuting his studies and later returning to his former
home."42 The Supreme Court of Illinois quoting Am. &
Eng. Enc. of Law, says, "A student in'a college town is pre-
sumed not to have the right to vote. If he attempts to vote,
the burden is upon him to prove his residence in that place,
and it must be done by other evidence than his mere
presence in thei town."4  Thus it would seem that there is
a presumption of fact recognized at common law that a
student at college is not domiciled there. Furthermore, in
all cases, students or otherwise, the burden of proving
change of domicile is on the person asserting it.4
Our case is that of a person, admittedly formerly domi-
ciled in another state, coming into the State and entering
an educational institution. He claims that his lomicile was
changed from one state to the other during the time he was
a student. We have the original burden of proof made
still heavier by the common law presumption against a
&I O Inion of Justices, 46 'Mass. (Mete.) 587 (1843).
Shaeffer v. Gilbert, 73 Md. 66, 20 AtL 434 (1890).
U Welch v. Shumway., 232 Ill. 54, 83 N. E. 549 (1908).
Starke v. Scott. I8 Va. 180 (1883)" Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 516. 27 At. 291(1893) ; Desmore v. U. S. 93 U. S. 605 (1876) ; In re Moir's Estate, 207 Ill. 180, 69
N. W. 905 (1904) * 9 R. C. L. 557; 19 C. J. 431.
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [1927], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol33/iss4/4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
change of domicile by a student, due to the temporary na-
ture of his occupation. In addition to these, we have an-
other factor. In twenty-two states there are constitutional
or statutory provisions or both to the effect that a person
shall not be held to have gained or lost a residence for
purposes of voting while a student at any institution of
learning.45  Does this provision mean anything? Does it
add to the general rule of law? The three cases quoted
above recognizing the presumption against a change of
domicile by a student are from states which do not have
the provision.
In Wisconsin, another state which does not have the
provision, the court after recognizing that "under this
constitutional provision it has been held that even four
years of study and express renouncing of all other homes
are not sufficient, of themselves, to give the status of quali-
fied elector" (citing the cases in New York, Colorado,
Missouri and Pennsylvania), says, "the provision, however,
does not seem to add anything to or change the general
rule of law. '46 Missouri, which has the provision says it
"is but a declaration of the law as generally recognized." 47
This seems also to be the view in Maine, and the principle
is stated, "The presumption is against a student's right
to vote, if he comes to college from out of town.' ' 48 In
Pennsylvania reference is made to the constitution as fol-
lows: "The constitution does not prohibit a student from
voting if he proves absolute abandonment of his former
residence. The burden is on the student."49  In Colorado
the constitution is cited although the decision apparently
would have beeni the same under the general rule of law.50
LDuisiana seems to concede more force to the constitutional
provision "The accepted rule seems to be that the effect
of such a constitutional provision is not to disqualify a
student from gaining or losing a residence at the seat of
0 Thn AM. LAW INST. TEATsISE No. 1 (a) CONFLICT OP LAWS. n. 105. Constitutional
provisions in Arizona. California. Colorado, Idaho, Kansas. Louisiana, Maine, Michigan.
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Virginia, Washington. Statutory provisions in Alabama, Arizona.
California, Colorado. Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New York, Utah, Vermont.
' Siebold v. Wabl. 164 Wis. 82, 159 N. W. 546 (1916).
T Hall v. Schoenecke. 128 Mo. 661, 81 S. W. 97 (1805).
Is Sanders v. Getchell, 76 Me. 158. 49 Am. Rep. 606 (1884).
' In re Lower Oxford Election, 11 Phila. 641 (1875).
'o Parsons v. People, S0 Colo. 888, 70 Pac. 689 (1902).
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the institution he is attending; but to render his presence
or absence from the institution primarily without effect
as to his political status."'r This suggestion, that his status
is to be determined independently of his presence or absence
from the institution, is significant, especially in light of
the New York series of cases 52 ending with In re Blankford
et a.53 in 1925 which goes a long way toward a virtual
prohibition of the acquisition of a voting residence .by stu-
dents.
In the Blankford Case seventeen men studying for the
priesthood at the seminary of St. Andrews on the Hudson
in the town of Hyde Park petitioned to compel the inspec-
tors of election to enroll their names on the register of
voters. They had previously been voters elsewhere in the
state but had formally notified the commissioners of elec-
tion at their former domiciles that such had been aban-
doned and new ones established at the location of the sem-
inary. They also filed affidavits with the inspectors of
elections at Hyde Park that they intended to reside there
indefinitely as, indeed, was the case because, by the rules
of the order, no one is allowed to remain in the seminary
as a student unless he intends in good faith to become a
priest and renounces all residences or homes save that of the
seminary itself, and upon his admission to the priesthood
he continued in the seminary unless and until assigned else-
where by his ecclesiastical superiors. It would seem that
here were ample grounds upon which to establish domicile
at common law and this the court does not deny but, in its
opinion, the constitutional provision takes the case out of
the common law. "We do not need to determine whether,
aside from the provisions of the constitution, a domicile in
Hyde Park might be found at common law upon the facts
established by petitioners. The constitution superseding
the rule at common law, whatever that may be, eliminates
from our consideration the fact of presence in the semin-
ary and requires us to find elsewhere, if at all, the evidence
of a change of domicile." Then quoting In re Goodman, a
4 Holmes v. Pino, surr n. 40.
Ir re Goodman, 146 N. Y. 284, 40 N. E. 769; Is re Barry, Garvey, Meiser et
al., 148 N. Y. 117, 41 N. E. 489; In re Gardiner, 167 N. Y. S. 26 (1917).
2 41 N. Y. 180, 149 N. E. 415 (1925).
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similar case thirty years previous, "The intention to change
is not alone sufficient. It must exist but must concur with
and -be manifest by resultant acts which are independent
of the presence as a student in the new locality."
In applying the New York rule to the case of a student
in attendance at a college in a giveh state we should have
to eliminate from our consideration the fact of his physical
presence at the institution. This is not an impossible or
even a difficult thing to do. Domicile is not dependent
upon actual abode or upon the physical presence of the
individual. A given case might be approached by asking,
if this student were to pack his trunk and transfer to a
college in another state tomorrow, would there be facts
sufficient to prove that his domicile remains here, and that
his abode elsewhere is temporary only? As a general rule
physical presence, in addition to the other elements, is nec-
essary to establish domicile but, once established, his tem-
porary absence in another state to attend school would
make no difference. Or, the problem might be approached
from another angle: would he be domiciled in the locality
which he claims if the institution of learning were not
there?
Bear in mind that these tests are sound only provided we
concede that the constitutional provision means that the
declarant shall not be allowed to avail himself of any cir-
cumstances dependent upon his presence as a student in
attempting to establish domicile. We have seen that this
has been the practical effect of the provision in some states
where the right of students to vote is involved and it is
not unlikely that the courts would so hold in those states
where excessive immigration of nonresident students has
been deemed a serious financial burden to taxpayers.
There has even been a minority inclination, in connection
with another class included in the same constitutional pro-
vision (inmates of a soldiers' home), to say that the estab-
lishment of a residence for voting is positively prohibited.14
" Silvey v. Lindsay, 107 N. Y. 65, 18 N. B. 444 (1887) ; In re Smith, 44 Misc.
884, 89 N. Y. S. 1006 (1904) W olcott v. Holcomb, 97 Mich. 861, 56 N. W. 8a7. 28
L. R. A. 216 (1893) ; People v. Hanna, 98 Mich. 515, 74 N. W. 788 (1894) ; Powell v.
Spzickman, 7 Idaho ,692, 65 Pac. 508, 54 L. IL A. 378 (1901) ; Lawrence v. Leldlgh, 58
Kan. 594, 50 Pac. 600 (1896). overruled by Cory v. Spencer, 67 Kan. 648, 73 Pac. 920,
68 L. B. A. 275 (1903).
17
Spencer: The Legal Aspects of the Nonresident Tuition Fee
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1927
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NONRESIDENT TUITION FEE 367
These cases are significant as suggesting the extent to which
the courts might go should it ever be deemed necessary to
the welfare of the state to make impossible the establish-
ment of a new domicile by persons attending school. The
argument used applies equally well to most students, and,
indeed, in the obiter dictum students are included.
In Wolcott v. Holcomb,55 the leading case amonj this
minority, the Michigan court held that the intent of the in-
mate of the soldiers' home to establish a residence was
wholly immaterial. Says the court, "To permit his intent
to control would result in the practical annulment of this
provision of the constitution. The mischief intended to be
avoided is as apparent in this case as in any. The inmates
of the home own no home, pay no local taxes, do no work
in or for the benefit of the municipality, and have no pecun-
iary interest in its local affairs. In fact, they have no con-
nection with, and stand in no relation to, the local municipal
government * * * * * *. If the construction were otherwise,
it follows that all the inmates of county almshouses and of
prisons and jails are electors, at their option, in the town-
ships and cities where those institutions are located * * * *.
Furthermore, students in all institutions of learning, al-
though they are in attendance there for the sole purpose of
obtaining an education, might, at their own will, become
electors in the places where such institutions are located.
We think the constitution prohibits a change of residence
under such circumstances 6 and that when one's presence
in any of the institutions named is due to the sole purpose
of receiving the benefits conferred, his former residence
must be considered his domicile."
This, case was not followed in a later Michigan case5" in-
volving a student, which was distinguished on the ground
that receiving the benefits of the institution was not the
sole purpose of the student's presence, as it was in the case
of the inmate of the soldiers' home. It might reasonably
be supposed that the decision would have been otherwise
had the student been of the ordinary type instead of a
mature man, for twelve years independent and totally self
C3 Ibid.
' The italics are ours.
1 People v. Osborne, 170 Mich. 148. 185 X. W. 921, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 168 (1912).
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supporting, who, as it appeared to the court, had no resi-
dence elsewhere and who would have been totally disen-
franchised had he not been declared a resident there.
We have assumed throughout this article that the deci-
sions pertaining to residence in connection with the right
to vote may be taken as authority on the question of resi-
dence in relation to the nonresident fee. Many persons
will, at this point, suggest that students might be classified
on the basis of their registration as voters. While the law
pertaining to voting is applicable to our problem it is, on
the other hand, most emphatically true that the fact of
voting in an individual case, unadjudicated by the courts,
is far from conclusive of the right to vote and is not a reliable
test of residence. There is a very common opinion current
that a man may vote anywhere he has lived the statutory
period. This notion is entirely without legal warrant, for
the right to register and vote depends upon an actual legal
residence, that is, upon domicile. Students who pay the
nonresident fee without question will sometimes register as
voters. On the other hand, students will sometimes regis-
ter for the purpose of substantiating their claim to resi-
dence. 8 In the absence of challenge or contest the proce-
dure of registering is largely a formality.59 The registrant's
statement that he has resided in the state six months can
be given but little weight for our purposes. Having, in
most instances, no knowledge of the legal meaning of
residence, he merely means that he has been present in
the locality six months. The unreliability of the fact of
voting as a test of residence is recognized by the courts.
The statutes of Oregon set out certain rules to be followed
in determining the qualification of electors. One of these
provides that if a person shall go from that state into any
other state or territory and there exercise the right of
suffrage, he shall be considered and held to have lost his
residence in that state. 0 This would seem to follow as a
matter of course, because residence as a basis for voting
clearly means domicile. Hence, in order to vote in another
13 A nonresident was directed by her father to register in order to avoid the fce.
0 One registrant, when asked, "What is required for voting?" answered, "Ono
must sign a card."
w Ore L. 3907.
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state without giving up his residence in Oregon a man would
have to vote illegally because he can have but one domi-
cile.01 But in the case of Miller v. Miller62 it was held
that the fact that one, after registering as a voter in Oregon,
went into another state and there voted, is not conclusive
of his domicile there, as regards jurisdiction in an action
for divorce. Saya the court: "This regulation is a conven-
tional one, applicable in its full force only to elections, and
was not intended to be controlling on any other subject.63
At best, it is only a circumstance to be weighed with other
evidence on the present issue." While the right to vote
theoretically depends on domicile, yet the court recognizes
that in practice the fact of voting is an unsound test of
domicile. In other words, nonresident voting is so common
that we must not take voting too seriously in determining
residence. The mere fact that one is registered in a certain
place and has voted therein is not conclusive on the question
of his domicile.64
That the testimony of the person who is to benefit by
the alleged change of domicile is not conclusive is well
established and anyone who has had direct contact with the
nonresident fee problem realizes how unreliable are the
self-serving statements of the students themselves. Too
much weight should not be attached to declarations of
present and future purpose by a student after the question
of residence is raised. 5 The statements made by a student
who has no thought of the nonresident fee in mind are likely
to be quite different from those made by him when attempt-
ing to avoid the fee. Declarations are of no avail when
evidently made for the purpose of creating evidence in favor
of the declarant after he has become appreciative of the
consequences of a change of domicile.66
Many people have the impression that upon becoming of
61 9 R. C. L. 539; 19 C. T. 398; In re Moir's Estate, supra n. 44.
' 67 Ore. 859, 136 Paa. 15 (1918).The italics are ours.
Smith iv. Croom, 7 Fla. 71 (1857) ; Easterly v. Goodwin, 85 Conn. 285, 95 Am.
Dec. 237 (1868); Hayes v. Hayes, 74 Ill. 312 (1874) ; East Livermore v. Farmington, 74
Me. 155 (1882): Enfield v. Ellington, 67 Conn. 459, 84 AtM 818 (1896); Bradley v.
Davis, 156 Cal. 267, 104 Pac. 302 (1909), citing Quinn v. Nevills, 7 Cal. App. 231, 93
Pac. 1055 (1908).
'. Lower Oxford Contested Election, supra n. 40; Anderson v. Pifer, supra n. 40;
Cohen V. Murrell, supra n. 40; Hall v. Schoenecke, supra n. 40.
as 19 C. T. 440.
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age and acquiring the legal capacity to establish a domi-
cile, a person may do so merely by saying that he has
formed an intention to make the locality his home. The
fact of intention is entirely within the mind of the individ-
ual and is subject to frequent change. It would be im-
posing somewhat upon human nature not to expect a stu-
dent, where several hundred dollars are involved, to be
able to form an intention to stay in the state indefinitely,
even though he may suspect that he will be forced to change
his mind and leave the state as soon as he is through
school, especially when his only home tie is membership in
a fraternity or dormitory where non-students are not wel-
come except as visitors.
This scepticism with which the student's declarations are
to be viewed is not attributable entirely to the temptation
to juggle with the truth. He may be sincere but mistaken.
"'Calling it his residence does not make it so. He may have
no right to so regard it. Believing the place to be his home
is not enough. There may be no foundation for the belief.
Swearing that it is his home must nolj be regarded as suffi-
cient, if the facts are adverse to it."' T Even bona fide intent
to establish a domicile is not sufficient. It must actually
be established.6
The Illinois cases €9 suggest the test of asking where the
student would go in case of sickness or other affliction. This
is a severe test and would exclude many who claim to have
changed domicile, for a student must be alienated from his
parental abode, indeed, who does not rely on that haven
of refuge in time of trouble. The Anderson Case 0 also
points out the danger of reliance on non-intention to return
to parents after graduation, "The fact that a student does
not expect to return home to live after he finishes school
is not a very important one, for most persons attending uni-
versities and colleges expect, when they graduate, to enter
some kind of business for themselves." Upon leaving home
and going to college a student may fully intend to abandon
Sanders v. Getchell, eupra n. 40.
In re Goodman, 8upra n. 40: In re Barry, supra n. 40; In re Blankford, Dupra
n. 40.
"Dale v. Irwin. supra n. 40; Welch v. Shumwayo eupra n. 40: Anderson v. Pifer,
aswra n. 40.TO Ibi.
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his father's domicile. But a domicile is not lost until
another is established. Conceivably a man might wander
all his life looking for a place to establish his domicile.
Until he does so, however, his former domicile remains. It
is generally understood that a student who has come to
college from a distance has done so in preparation for his
life work. It is absurd for him or anyone else, in most
cases, to contend that he has settled down and established
a permanent home.
And yet there will be exceptional cases. Our problem is
how to determine the bona fide exceptions. The meaning
of the term residence cannot be made a matter of legisla-
tive construction, it is purely a judicial question, and while
general rules and definitions as to its meaning may be
laid down by the courts, there can be no absolute criterion
by which to determine where a person actually resides.
Each case must depend on its particular facts or circum-
stances.7 1
If it is to be the policy of a given institution to enforce
the rule as strictly as possible, residence should be held to
mean domicile and the law of domicile should govern. The
one-year rule should be adopted. Until the courts rule to
the contrary, the constitutional provision should be given
full weight, enforcing the presumption that the sojourn
of a student is not a legal residence. A nonresident
at the time of his enrollment should be held to that
classification throughout his presence as a student except
in those rare cases where it can be proved that his previous
domicile has been abandoned and a new one established in-
dependently of the school or of his attendance thereupon.
The purpose of this article has been to suggest the extent
to which the courts might be relied upon to sustain rules
designed to restrict the immigration of students. The wis-
dom of such restriction as a civic policy may be in doubt.
In any event, a state or an institution should determine its
policy with an understanding of the legal meaning and por-
tent of terms used. If a mild and lenient restriction is all
that is desired, it should be so expressed in clear language.
n 9 R. C. L. 1081.
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Attempt should not be made to attain this end by enacting
strict rules and then, through indifferent enforcement, leav-
ing it to the ingenuity of the students to evade and circum-
vent the law.
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